Unicorns and the ToE

[Febble]

Thank you Joz ... For setting Febble straight on the WHY issue.

As for HOW things work, creationists are all over that ... We--like the creationist founders of modern science--are not content to say Goddidit as so many know-nothings allege. We want to know HOW he did it and, since our paradigm actually has a basis in observed reality, we have an advantage over scientists operating under a non-ID paradigm. This paradigm difference is why, for example, that a handful of creationist geologists were able to turn conventional geology on its ear and bring about the revival of catastrophism.

Sorry, but no.

There are two meanings of "why?" that are relevant here. One is teleological, and concerns agency. It is synonymous with: "for what purpose [did X happen]?" So: "why did you steal the money?" becomes "for what purpose did you steal the money?" The other meaning is causal, and is equivalent to:" what caused [X to happen]?" So "why did you steal the money becomes "what caused you to steal the money?"

The two questions have quite different answers. The answer to the first might be "to buy food". The answer to the second might be: "hunger".

Science primarily concerns itself with the second meaning of why, although the first is also of scientific interest, inasmuch as it is concerned with questions of agency. It is a myth that science does not concern itself with agency. "Why is the peacock's tail so magnificent?" can be answered, scientifically, in both senses of the word "why?"

And the question: "why is are organisms structured in a nested hierarchy?" can be answered beautifully and simply with the scientific answer: "common descent".

Creationism cannot answer the question at all, except to say "God must have wanted to do it that way".

[SteveF]

This paradigm difference is why, for example, that a handful of creationist geologists were able to turn conventional geology on its ear and bring about the revival of catastrophism.

This is so false it's laughable.

[JOZeldenrust]

Sorry, but no.

There are two meanings of "why?" that are relevant here. One is teleological, and concerns agency. It is synonymous with: "for what purpose [did X happen]?" So: "why did you steal the money?" becomes "for what purpose did you steal the money?" The other meaning is causal, and is equivalent to:" what caused [X to happen]?" So "why did you steal the money becomes "what caused you to steal the money?"

The two questions have quite different answers. The answer to the first might be "to buy food". The answer to the second might be: "hunger".

Science primarily concerns itself with the second meaning of why, although the first is also of scientific interest, inasmuch as it is concerned with questions of agency. It is a myth that science does not concern itself with agency. "Why is the peacock's tail so magnificent?" can be answered, scientifically, in both senses of the word "why?"

And the question: "why is are organisms structured in a nested hierarchy?" can be answered beautifully and simply with the scientific answer: "common descent".

Creationism cannot answer the question at all, except to say "God must have wanted to do it that way".

Indeed, I should have made that more explicit: science doesn't concern itself with teleological investigations of agency. Anyone who has ever had to entertain a six-year-old should know that "why" questions become unanswerable very quickly. Saying "because God" or some equivalent of same is a cheap cop out.

[VoxRat]

... Anyone who has ever had to entertain a six-year-old should know that "why" questions become unanswerable very quickly. Saying "because God" or some equivalent of same is a cheap cop out.

Maybe that's how the concept was invented... to silence an annoying six-year-old without running afoul of whatever paleolithic sanctions they had against child-beating.

[Febble]

Sorry, but no.

There are two meanings of "why?" that are relevant here. One is teleological, and concerns agency. It is synonymous with: "for what purpose [did X happen]?" So: "why did you steal the money?" becomes "for what purpose did you steal the money?" The other meaning is causal, and is equivalent to:" what caused [X to happen]?" So "why did you steal the money becomes "what caused you to steal the money?"

The two questions have quite different answers. The answer to the first might be "to buy food". The answer to the second might be: "hunger".

Science primarily concerns itself with the second meaning of why, although the first is also of scientific interest, inasmuch as it is concerned with questions of agency. It is a myth that science does not concern itself with agency. "Why is the peacock's tail so magnificent?" can be answered, scientifically, in both senses of the word "why?"

And the question: "why is are organisms structured in a nested hierarchy?" can be answered beautifully and simply with the scientific answer: "common descent".

Creationism cannot answer the question at all, except to say "God must have wanted to do it that way".

Indeed, I should have made that more explicit: science doesn't concern itself with teleological investigations of agency. Anyone who has ever had to entertain a six-year-old should know that "why" questions become unanswerable very quickly. Saying "because God" or some equivalent of same is a cheap cop out.

I'm afraid, as a behavioural scientist, I have to disagree. Behavioural science certainly concerns itself with teleological question (e.g. "why do children ask questions?"). But more fundamentally, many biological questions benefit from being looked at teleologically, i.e. by taking what Dennett calls the "Design Stance". Recently, scientists discovered that the appendix had a function as a reservoir for gut flora, enabling the gut to be rapidly repopulated after an infection. The question to which that turns out to be the answer is a teleological question. If we simply looked at the appendix from the Physical Stance, we would explain it simply as a vestigial bit of gut. Looked at from the Design Stance, it is "for" helping us survive gastrointestinal infections.

That doesn't mean that someone designed it of course. It just means that by regarding natural selection as an agent we can address an important question: why would something as apparently problematic as our appendix have been selected for?

[RAFH]

Thank you Joz ... For setting Febble straight on the WHY issue.

As for HOW things work, creationists are all over that ... We--like the creationist founders of modern science--are not content to say Goddidit as so many know-nothings allege. We want to know HOW he did it and, since our paradigm actually has a basis in observed reality, we have an advantage over scientists operating under a non-ID paradigm. This paradigm difference is why, for example, that a handful of creationist geologists were able to turn conventional geology on its ear and bring about the revival of catastrophism.

And what planet are you living on, davey?

Can you produce these science revolutionizing works? Please do.

[JOZeldenrust]

I'm afraid, as a behavioural scientist, I have to disagree. Behavioural science certainly concerns itself with teleological question (e.g. "why do children ask questions?"). But more fundamentally, many biological questions benefit from being looked at teleologically, i.e. by taking what Dennett calls the "Design Stance". Recently, scientists discovered that the appendix had a function as a reservoir for gut flora, enabling the gut to be rapidly repopulated after an infection. The question to which that turns out to be the answer is a teleological question. If we simply looked at the appendix from the Physical Stance, we would explain it simply as a vestigial bit of gut. Looked at from the Design Stance, it is "for" helping us survive gastrointestinal infections.

That doesn't mean that someone designed it of course. It just means that by regarding natural selection as an agent we can address an important question: why would something as apparently problematic as our appendix have been selected for?

It's a limited teleology, though. There's no "ultimate purpose", just relative purpose. I agree that teleological questions with a limited scope are very usefull, it's just that the answer to such questions aren't inherent to reality, but rather to our conceptualization of reality.

Religious folk assume an ultimate teleological answer that is inherent to reality, in most cases in the shape of a supreme being. It's a form of metaphysical idealism that just doesn't make any sense.

[RAFH]

I'd question the notion that traits are selected for. Rather, they are or are not selected against, which is quite different. It's the old success works. Failure does not. Those traits which do not lead to failure survive. That's what explains the existence and persistence of 'neutral' mutations.

Also, the gut flora concept is not exactly an accepted issue, yet. There is evidence that is a possibility, but it remains a long ways from general acceptance. From http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/10/05....ap/index.html

Some scientists think they have figured out the real job of the troublesome and seemingly useless appendix: It produces and protects good germs for your gut.

That's the theory from surgeons and immunologists at Duke University Medical School, published online in a scientific journal this week.

and in this case, the term 'theory' is being used in its more common sense rather than the usual scientific sense. Appendixes as reservoirs of gut flora hardly rises to the level of a scientific theory, whether accepted or not, it is a detail, not a general principle.

In any case, selection can not select for, because there is no goal in mind to use as a template for what is good or bad. It can, however, select against, that which does not work, either substantially (in which case the organism dies prior to reproduction or the offspring are not viable) or just partially (in which case, the organism is doesn't do as well as its competitors and fails to reproduce as successfully and/or its offspring are not as successful). Sort of 'what doesn't kill ya will make you stronger'.

For there to be selection for, there would have to be a prior template of what's successful and that would include prescience of what environmental changes the future holds, which is pretty much denied by all of science. If you have observational evidence that show such prescience, I'd sure like to see it. I imagine a lot of other people would be interested as well.

[Febble]

I'm afraid, as a behavioural scientist, I have to disagree. Behavioural science certainly concerns itself with teleological question (e.g. "why do children ask questions?"). But more fundamentally, many biological questions benefit from being looked at teleologically, i.e. by taking what Dennett calls the "Design Stance". Recently, scientists discovered that the appendix had a function as a reservoir for gut flora, enabling the gut to be rapidly repopulated after an infection. The question to which that turns out to be the answer is a teleological question. If we simply looked at the appendix from the Physical Stance, we would explain it simply as a vestigial bit of gut. Looked at from the Design Stance, it is "for" helping us survive gastrointestinal infections.

That doesn't mean that someone designed it of course. It just means that by regarding natural selection as an agent we can address an important question: why would something as apparently problematic as our appendix have been selected for?

It's a limited teleology, though. There's no "ultimate purpose", just relative purpose. I agree that teleological questions with a limited scope are very usefull, it's just that the answer to such questions aren't inherent to reality, but rather to our conceptualization of reality.

Science is all about are conceptualization of reality. We do not have access to reality. All we have are models of it.

Religious folk assume an ultimate teleological answer that is inherent to reality, in most cases in the shape of a supreme being.

Sure.

It's a form of metaphysical idealism that just doesn't make any sense.

Idealism doesn't have to make sense, at least not in the sense that science does. That's not what it's for. Religion deals in normative models. Science deals in predictive models. That's the real NOMA - not "why" questions versus "how" questions, but "why" versus "ought" questions. Not that religion has a monopoly on "ought" questions, of course. I think creationism leads to bad moral philosophy as well as to bad science, but that's for a different forum

[Febble]

I'd question the notion that traits are selected for. Rather, they are or are not selected against, which is quite different.

Nah. That's like saying you don't toss heads, you just fail to toss tails.

It's the old success works. Failure does not. Those traits which do not lead to failure survive. That's what explains the existence and persistence of 'neutral' mutations.

OK, but that's not the interesting part. Sure, selecting against harmful traits explains why neutral mutations are retained (perhaps to come in useful in the future). But selection for useful traits explains some amazing stuff, from peacock tails to bombadier beetles.

Also, the gut flora concept is not exactly an accepted issue, yet. There is evidence that is a possibility, but it remains a long ways from general acceptance. From http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/10/05....ap/index.html

Some scientists think they have figured out the real job of the troublesome and seemingly useless appendix: It produces and protects good germs for your gut.

That's the theory from surgeons and immunologists at Duke University Medical School, published online in a scientific journal this week.

and in this case, the term 'theory' is being used in its more common sense rather than the usual scientific sense. Appendixes as reservoirs of gut flora hardly rises to the level of a scientific theory, whether accepted or not, it is a detail, not a general principle.

Sure. That may turn out to be wrong. But my point was that it is a teleological question. It is formulated using the Design Stance. With which, with Dennett, I see nothing wrong.

In any case, selection can not select for, because there is no goal in mind to use as a template for what is good or bad.

Well, there is no mind for there to be a goal in. Dennett would reserve the term "Intentional stance" for systems in which a goal is represented in some kind of a mind. But I would argue (and I think Dennett would) that that's no reason to eschew a teleologically framed question, if framing it that way yields a useful answer.

It can, however, select against, that which does not work, either substantially (in which case the organism dies prior to reproduction or the offspring are not viable) or just partially (in which case, the organism is doesn't do as well as its competitors and fails to reproduce as successfully and/or its offspring are not as successful). Sort of 'what doesn't kill ya will make you stronger'.

For there to be selection for, there would have to be a prior template of what's successful and that would include prescience

There's a template of sorts (encoded as an unfilled niche) but no prescience, because no mind.

of what environmental changes the future holds, which is pretty much denied by all of science. If you have observational evidence that show such prescience, I'd sure like to see it. I imagine a lot of other people would be interested as well.

Of course I haven't. I'm not claiming prescience, because I'm not arguing for a mind. On the other hand, once you start asking what prescience actually is, and therefore what a mind actually is, then minds and evolutionary systems cease to look quite so different from each other. What is it that you know before there is something for you to know? Who is it that is doing the knowing?

[ericmurphy]

Not conceding anything here.

Too late now, Dave. You've already conceded that special creation has no explanation for nested hierarchies. Evolutionary theory does. This directly contradicts your earlier claim, and now you're stuck with the fact that you cannot refute the single strongest piece of evidence for evolutionary theory: nested hierarchies of all organisms.

You have misunderstood. Creationism is quite scientific and is in fact more consistent with the evidence that we actually have than Methodological Naturalism and it's child (so to speak), the ToE. I'll explain from a different angle tomorrow and perhaps it will become clear.

No it won't. You've already admitted that special creation cannot explain the existence of nested hierarchies. I'm not going to let you back down on that admission unless and until you can actually come up with an explanation that holds water.

This is typical of you, Dave. You made an admission, not realizing it totally blows your claims—all of them—out of the water. Then, after half a dozen posters point out to you your utter defeat, you try to backpedal, claim you didn't admit anything, and just say we all misunderstood you.

We didn't misunderstand you. You just made a fatal admission: that special creation cannot account for the observed phylogenetic tree. That kills—dead, beyond all possibility of resurrection—your claim that special creation is even in competition with evolutionary theory as an explanation for biodiversity.

[ericmurphy]

I said it cannot explain WHY. Please read what I write very carefully.

Dave, we are reading carefully. And evolutionary theory absolutely can explain why organisms sort into nested hierarchies. If special creation cannot explain why organisms sort into nested hierarchies, then it's worthless as an explanation for biodiversity. Which is what we have been telling you for almost two years now.

[VoxRat]

Idealism doesn't have to make sense, at least not in the sense that science does. That's not what it's for. Religion deals in normative models. Science deals in predictive models. That's the real NOMA - not "why" questions versus "how" questions, but "why" versus "ought" questions. Not that religion has a monopoly on "ought" questions, of course. I think creationism leads to bad moral philosophy as well as to bad science, but that's for a different forum

What forum might that be?
Because it's actually a very interesting question.
I'm particularly interested in the environmental aspects.
I'm wondering whether I'd be able to work together with someone like Richard Cizik, who has apparently pissed off the evangelical community by taking global warming seriously.

Also, having read both Gould and Dawkins on the NOMA thing - though I have all kinds of sympathy for Gould and his position, I have to say Dawkins makes much more sense to me.

[ericmurphy]

Can you explain WHY the ancient Hittites did everything they did? No. You can make pretty safe guesses on many things, but there are other things that will remain a mystery as to WHY they did it that way. Is the study of the archaeology of the Hittites unscientific because of this? Of course not. Same for the unobserved Creator as for the unobserved Hittites.

Dave, we're not comparing evolutionary theory to archaeology. We're comparing evolutionary theory to special creation, on the very specific issue of why organisms—all organisms, living and extinct—sort into nested hierarchies. Evolutionary theory has a very simple, straightforward explanation for why they do. You just admitted (as if we didn't know already) that special creation does not have an explanation.

You lose. In, like, a really big way.

[JOZeldenrust]

Science is all about are conceptualization of reality. We do not have access to reality. All we have are models of it.

So we can never have an answer to the ultimate teleological "why", just a description of the "how", though it's still impossible to know if there isn't an even more basic underlying principle at work. I suspect we pretty much agree, but my choice of words, my frame of reference being largely based on the "hard" sciences as opposed to your social science background, is causing some confusion. My main concern is that asking teleological "why" questions leads to unjustified personification of the universe.

Sure.

Idealism doesn't have to make sense, at least not in the sense that science does. That's not what it's for. Religion deals in normative models. Science deals in predictive models. That's the real NOMA - not "why" questions versus "how" questions, but "why" versus "ought" questions. Not that religion has a monopoly on "ought" questions, of course. I think creationism leads to bad moral philosophy as well as to bad science, but that's for a different forum

This might be a result of English not being my native language. In Dutch, the use of "why" in the sense of asking for causes is much less common then in English, so it almost always implies there is an "ought" answer to the question. Again, I think we pretty much agree, but got to this point from different directions, causing some confusion in terminology.

[Occam's Aftershave]

Not conceding anything here. You have misunderstood. Creationism is quite scientific and is in fact more consistent with the evidence that we actually have than Methodological Naturalism and it's child (so to speak), the ToE.

Afdave's Fifth Law: The truth of all previously established facts and conclusions are subject to their being convenient to the argument I am presently making.

[ericmurphy]

Thank you Joz ... For setting Febble straight on the WHY issue.

As for HOW things work, creationists are all over that ... We--like the creationist founders of modern science--are not content to say Goddidit as so many know-nothings allege. We want to know HOW he did it and, since our paradigm actually has a basis in observed reality, we have an advantage over scientists operating under a non-ID paradigm. This paradigm difference is why, for example, that a handful of creationist geologists were able to turn conventional geology on its ear and bring about the revival of catastrophism.

Dave, you just said you have no idea why God made all organisms look like they're related to each other through common descent. And you certainly have not the slightest idea how God could have done so, or how He could have done it any other way, either. So not only do you not know why organisms sort into nested hierarchies; you also don't know how God could have made them sort into nested hierarchies.

So special creation is no more "all over" the how of biodiversity than it is the why.

[Febble]

Idealism doesn't have to make sense, at least not in the sense that science does. That's not what it's for. Religion deals in normative models. Science deals in predictive models. That's the real NOMA - not "why" questions versus "how" questions, but "why" versus "ought" questions. Not that religion has a monopoly on "ought" questions, of course. I think creationism leads to bad moral philosophy as well as to bad science, but that's for a different forum

What forum might that be?

I dunno, maybe The Spa, maybe EAC. But I'm happy to derail here, if it's OK with the janitor science advisor.
Because it's actually a very interesting question.
I'm particularly interested in the environmental aspects.
I'm wondering whether I'd be able to work together with someone like Richard Cizik, who has apparently pissed off the evangelical community by taking global warming seriously.

Also, having read both Gould and Dawkins on the NOMA thing - though I have all kinds of sympathy for Gould and his position, I have to say Dawkins makes much more sense to me.[/QUOTE]

Well, I haven't read Gould, but as a statement of what IS, he seems to be wrong. Theists wade into what should be the sole domain of science the whole time. But it seems clear to me that there are NOMAs, and that while we need to pay attention to science in order to decide on what we ought to do, deciding what we ought to do isn't itself a scientific question, and shouldn't be. I'm not sure it should be a religious question either, frankly. I think it's a moral philosophy question.

My own view is that religion is, essentially, about the way we model the relationship between ourselves and the rest of the universe. Even if we reject a religious model. Mine happens to be a religious model, but I'm less concerned with the labels on the model than its shape. I may replace the labels one of these days. But I'll still have a model of my relationship with the rest of the universe, and that will still be my religion.

[VoxRat]

...
This might be a result of English not being my native language. In Dutch, the use of "why" in the sense of asking for causes is much less common then in English, so it almost always implies there is an "ought" answer to the question. Again, I think we pretty much agree, but got to this point from different directions, causing some confusion in terminology.

Just out of curiosity, how are the two "why's":

"for what purpose" and
"from what cause"

expressed in Dutch?

I know English, obviously (Well, I hope it's obvious; I had the impression on my one visit to The Netherlands that most Dutch could express themselves better in English than most Americans) and I was once officially "fluent" (according to the University of California) in German. So I'm hoping I'll at least recognize the etymology of the Dutch words you're about to tell me.

[VoxRat]

Well, I haven't read Gould, but as a statement of what IS, he seems to be wrong. Theists wade into what should be the sole domain of science the whole time. But it seems clear to me that there are NOMAs, and that while we need to pay attention to science in order to decide on what we ought to do, deciding what we ought to do isn't itself a scientific question, and shouldn't be. I'm not sure it should be a religious question either, frankly. I think it's a moral philosophy question.

My own view is that religion is, essentially, about the way we model the relationship between ourselves and the rest of the universe. Even if we reject a religious model. Mine happens to be a religious model, but I'm less concerned with the labels on the model than its shape. I may replace the labels one of these days. But I'll still have a model of my relationship with the rest of the universe, and that will still be my religion.

This does seem like an interesting dialog; one I'd really like to pursue. But definitely a derail as far as this thread goes.

Hold that thought, while we find a better place to continue the conversation...

[JOZeldenrust]

Just out of curiosity, how are the two "why's":

"for what purpose" and
"from what cause"

expressed in Dutch?

I know English, obviously (Well, I hope it's obvious; I had the impression on my one visit to The Netherlands that most Dutch could express themselves better in English than most Americans) and I was once officially "fluent" (according to the University of California) in German. So I'm hoping I'll at least recognize the etymology of the Dutch words you're about to tell me.

There are words that correspond 1 on 1 with the English "why" and "how":

Why = "waarom"
How = "hoe"

They can be used as the exact equivalent to the English versions, but in Dutch the use of "waarom" is much more common as a "teleological why", to the point of implying a normative question, and most uses of the "causal why" can be more accurately translated in Dutch by using "hoe".

For instance, someone might ask: "Why is the sky blue?"

The literal translation would be "Waarom is de lucht blauw?", which is a legitimate question, but it's closer to "What purpose does a blue sky serve?" then the original question, so as an answer "zomaar" ("no reason") is more appropriate then it is in English. To avoid such ambivalence, it's often better to phrase the question as a "how" question: "Hoe komt het dat de lucht blauw is?" ("How come the sky is blue?").

It's a really subtle difference in the use of the words, but as I think mainly in Dutch, such nuances permeat my thinking.

Edit: "Waarom" (why) can be used in both cases, but it's more common in the meaning "for what purpose". To express "from what cause" more explicitely, it's often appropriate to use "Hoe komt het dat..." (how come...)

[Susannah]

I'd question the notion that traits are selected for. Rather, they are or are not selected against, which is quite different.

That's an excellent point, and clears up quite a few silly questions, "why" questions among them. It means that, "Why not?" is a valid answer.

[Martin B]

This was my original questions to Dave:

To reiterate and modify an example I brought up before: How does creationism explain the fact that animals as different as a elephant and a great white shark have three semicircular canals of the inner ear and a backbone? What cause is there for this similarity in two completely different animals? Why couldn't it have been accomplished in a different way?

There are no teleological implications here. I'm not asking for purposes at all. I'm asking specifically for explanations: some sort of reasons that the patterns occur the way they do. I was asking for some sort of existential explanation, and I don't think my question even implied this. At all. I only used "why" once.

[ericmurphy]

There are no teleological implications here. I'm not asking for purposes at all. I'm asking specifically for explanations: some sort of reasons that the patterns occur the way they do. I was asking for some sort of existential explanation, and I don't think my question even implied this. At all. I only used "why" once.

Another way to put things: "What is a proposed set of circumstances which would have resulted in a universal phylogenetic tree in which all organisms on earth sort into nested hierarchies?"

No teleology here. A request for a mechanism which would result in the observation of nested hierarchies.

The answer, of course—the only known answer—is that all organisms are related via common descent from one or a small number of universal common ancestors.

I didn't use the word "why" at all.

ETA: Dave's not going to wriggle out of his admission by some sort of philosophical tap-dancing over definitions of the word "why." The fact is, Dave has admitted quite clearly that special creation has no explanation for nested hierarchies. This is what Dave said:

Creationism cannot explain why this is the case any more than I can explain why my wife likes flowery wallpaper or why she likes eating boiled cabbage. We're talking about a Super Intelligence here with a free will. We would expect Him (if He exists) to do unexpected things. You know the expression, "Kids say the darndest things"? That's because they are free spirits and this God we postulate would be too, if He does in fact exist. For all I know God made elephants with trunks just to entertain kids at zoos. I mean why not? If I were God, I'd make some funny creatures to make kids laugh. Back to your specific questions, I can only guess the mind of God ... maybe backbones and triple canals are good design ... just like alternators are good design for supplying electricity in cars. Car designers use them in widely varying models of cars and why wouldn't they? Why re-invent the wheel, as they say.

(my bold)

In other words, Dave, special creation has nothing to say on the central issue the whole of evolutionary theory was formulated to explain: what is the reason behind the patterns in organisms, patterns that allow us to classify them according to objective criteria? This was the issue that puzzled Linneaus and others: they knew that living organisms (and precious little else) could be organized into categories that did not depend on what particular characteristics were assumed to be important. Darwin answered that question in On the Origin of Species, an answer that has changed radically in its particulars but not one whit in its generality:

Common Descent With Modification of All Organisms.

It's the only explanation, Dave, and your claims otherwise have been exposed (by you, as it happens) as empty rhetoric.

[Dave Hawkins]

This was my original questions to Dave:

To reiterate and modify an example I brought up before: How does creationism explain the fact that animals as different as a elephant and a great white shark have three semicircular canals of the inner ear and a backbone? What cause is there for this similarity in two completely different animals? Why couldn't it have been accomplished in a different way?

There are no teleological implications here. I'm not asking for purposes at all. I'm asking specifically for explanations: some sort of reasons that the patterns occur the way they do. I was asking for some sort of existential explanation, and I don't think my question even implied this. At all. I only used "why" once.

And my answer is the same. I cannot explain the reasons for many patterns in Nature. But I would not expect to be able to if an Intelligence created it all. But this does not hinder science at all. The fun part of science is trying to figure out how "Goddidit." And figure out how things work. And science is actually bolstered if we believe that "Goddidit" because then we are operating under a paradigm which is not contradictory to known observation. Don't forget that the Founders of Modern Science were not only creationists ... many of them were Fundies! Puritans!